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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff)'Appellee, 
v. 
MICHAEL OLIVER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Consolidated Case No. 20030286-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals his sentences imposed pursuant to his guilty pleas to one count of 
burglary of a dwelling, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 
(2003), two counts of burglary of a building, third degree felonies, in violation of section 76-
6-202, and one count of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (2002). This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly conclude that no constitutional violation occurred in 
sentencing where defendant's current crimes and past criminal history were disclosed in the 
presentence report and formed the basis of the court's determination that concurrent terms 
of imprisonment were the most appropriate sentences for the multiple felony convictions? 
A trial court's determination that a sentence was legally imposed is reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 858-59 (Utah 1995); State v. Patience, 944 
P.2d 381, 384-85 (Utah App. 1997). Its underlying factual determinations are reviewed for 
clear error. See State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, If 9, 31 P.3d 615, affirmed, State v. 
Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, 79 P.3d 937. 
A trial court's determination of what sentence is appropriate is upheld unless "'no 
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.'" State v. Corbitt, 2003 
UT App 417, U 6, 82 P.3d 211 (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The language of no provision is determinative of the outcome of this appeal, which 
is fact-based. Any provisions cited in argument, however, are attached in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a consolidated appeal from three district court cases.1 On June 17, 2002, 
defendant was charged in Second District Case No. 021701014 [hereafter #1014], with: 
Count I: Burglary of a Dwelling, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (2003); 
Count II: Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (2003); 
1
 Each case has a separate pleadings file, which the State designates by the last 
four digits of its district court number. There is only one set of hearing transcripts. 
2 
Count III: Possession of a Controlled Substance (M ethamphetamine), a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (2002); 
Count IV: Vehicle Burglary, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-204 (2003); 
Count V: Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (2002); and, 
Count VI: Unlawful Possession of Burglary Tools, a class B misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-205 (2003). 
(R#1014: 1-3, 35-37). Two months later, on August 27, 2002, defendant was charged in 
Second District Case No. 02170147 [hereafter #1447] with: 
Count I: Burglary of a Dwelling, a second degree felony, in violation of 
section 76-6-202; 
Count II: Unlawful Acquisition, Possession, or Transfer of a Credit Card, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.3 (2003); 
and, 
Count III: Theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-404 (2003). 
(R#1447: 1-3). On September 5, 2002, defendant was charged in Second District Case No. 
021701498 [hereafter #1498], with: 
Count I: Burglary of a Dwelling, a second degree felony, in violation of 
section 76-6-202; and, 
Count II: Theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of section 76-6-404. 
(R#1498: 1-2). Though the informations were filed at different times, the criminal conduct 
occurred between June 6-14, 2002. See Addendum B (Informations). 
3 
On November 21, 2002, defendant pled guilty to four felonies pursuant to a plea 
bargain. In case #1014, defendant pled guilty to second-degree burglary (Count I) and felony 
possession of a controlled substance (Count II), and the remaining four charges were 
dismissed (R#1014: 40-50). In case #1447, defendant pled guilty to a reduced charge of 
third-degree burglary of a building (Count I reduced) and the remaining two counts were 
dismissed (R#1447: 12-18). In case #1498, defendant pled guilty to a reduced charge of 
third-degree burglary of a building (Count I reduced) and the theft charge was dismissed 
(R#1498: 10-17). See Add B (Defendant's Statement in Advance of Pleas). • 
Pursuant to the parties' agreement, defendant's drug possession plea in case #1014 
was entered nunc pro tunc to the date of the offense, which protected defendant's driver's 
license from further revocation (R#1014: 43; R89-Part 2: 6).2 The prosecutor also agreed 
that if defendant were sentenced to and successfully completed probation, the State would 
not oppose a motion to further reduce the degree of the convictions pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §76-3-402 (2003) (R#1014:43; R#1447:15;R#1498:13).3 Defendant understood that 
any sentencing recommendations were not binding on the trial court and he could receive 
consecutive prison terms for each felony (id.). See Add. B. 
2
 Record 89 contains a transcript of the morning sentencing hearing (Part I) and the 
afternoon discussion between defense counsel and the judge (Part 2). The State 
designates Part 1 as "R89" and Part 2 as "R89-Part 2." 
3
 Section 76-3-402, commonly referred to as a 402 reduction, permits a conviction 
to be reduced by one degree or, if the prosecutor agrees in writing, by two degrees upon a 
defendant's successful completion of probation (Add. A). The grant of any reduction is 
purely discretionary with the trial court. 
4 
The Department of Adult Probation and Parole [AP & P] prepared a presentence 
investigation report [PSI], which recommended probation, conditioned upon defendant 
serving jail time of either six months straight time or twelve months with work release (R89: 
12;R89-Part2: ll).4 
On January 16, 2003, the court rejected AP & P's recommendation and sentenced 
defendant to the statutorily-authorized term of one-to-fifteen years imprisonment in case 
#1014, and to three statutorily-authorized terms of zero-to-five years imprisonment in cases 
#1014,#1447,and#1498, all sentences to run concurrently (R#1014: 53-54; R#1447:22-23; 
R#1498: 20-21). Based on AP & P's assessment, the court imposed $3883.92 in restitution 
plus other costs (id). See Addendum C (Sentencing Hearing). 
On February 10,2003, defendant filed a motion to "correct" what he claimed were his 
illegally-imposed sentences pursuant to rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and 
a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (2002) 
(R#1014: 55-62; R#1447: 24-31; R#1498: 22-29). On March 27, 2003, the motions were 
denied (R#1014: 91-92; R#1447: 57-58; R#1498: 56-57). 
4
 Defendant's arguments are based on the contents of the PSI, even though he does 
not attack the report's validity. Consequently, he was obligated to include the PSI in the 
record on appeal, but has failed to do so. See State v. Headley, 2002 UT App 58 (a copy 
of the unpublished opinion is attached in Addendum F in compliance with rule 30(f), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure). The record otherwise establishes the basic parameters of 
AP & P's recommendation. But other alleged facts—such as defendant's criminal history 
and personal characteristics—are incapable of verification without the PSI. Because the 
record on appeal is incomplete, this Court must assume the regularity of the trial 
proceedings and construe any "ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom" in favor 
of the lower court's rulings. See id. 
5 
On April 1, 2003, defendant timely appealed (R#1014: 93, 101; R#1447: 59, 66; 
R#1498: 58, 66). Defendant does not attack the validity of his guilty pleas on appeal, but 
only challenges the legality and reasonableness of his sentences.5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS6 
Between June 6 and June 12, 2002, defendant burglarized the attached garages of 
three homes and stole cash, checkbooks, credit cards, cell telephones, keys, compact audio 
discs, jewelry, sunglasses, and other objects located in the garages and inside vehicles in the 
garages (R#1014: 2, 41, 100; R#1447: 2-3, 13, 70; R#1498: 2, 11, 62). Following the 
burglaries, some of the stolen checks were forged and some of the stolen credit cards used 
to obtain goods and money at various stores (id.). Defendant's wife, Briana Salgado Oliver, 
and two others, Bradon Larkin and Jereme Ogren, assisted defendant (id.). When Larkin was 
arrested by the police, he confessed and named defendant (id.). 
5
 Below, defendant characterized his challenge as a rule 22(e) motion (R#1014: 57-
62; R108: 4). Rule 22(e) permits an illegal sentence to be corrected at any time and, 
consequently, is a narrow jurisdictional rule applicable only to untimely claims of patent 
or manifest sentencing error. State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, If 15, 84 P.3d 854. 
Here, defendant's motion to correct his sentences was filed with a timely motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas, which tolled the time for appeal. See UTAH CODE ANN. 77-13-
6 (2002) (subsequently amended) {Add. A); UTAH R. APP. P. 4(b). As a result, jurisdiction 
is not at issue and defendant may attack his sentences on any grounds preserved below. 
If, however, jurisdiction were at issue, defendant's allegations would not amount to 
cognizable rule 22(e) error. See Thorkelson, id. at ^ | 15 & 17. 
6
 The facts are stated in the light most favorable to the trial court's rulings. See 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 2, 12 P.3d 92. 
6 
On June 14, 2002, a search warrant was executed on defendant's apartment (id.). 
Numerous stolen credit cards and stolen property, valued in the thousands of dollars, were 
found (id.).7 Methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia were also located (id.). 
Defendant was charged with eleven offenses: three second-degree felonies, three 
third-degree felonies, one class-A misdemeanor, and four class-B misdemeanors. See 
Statement of the Case, supra. Pursuant to a plea bargain, he pled guilty to one second degree 
felony and three third degree felonies, two of which were reduced charges (id.). The 
remaining seven charges were dismissed (id.). See Add. B. 
Defendant admitted he was a methamphetamine addict (R89:2-3).8 Defense counsel, 
who was also defendant's father, claimed his son had reformed since his arrest, but conceded 
that defendant had a ten-year history of criminal offenses (R89: 11; R89-Part 2: 3-5, 16; 
R108: 5-6,13-14). Beginning when he was 16 years old, defendant had juvenile court 
adjudications for possession of tobacco, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia, and had received counseling in connection with two incidents of shoplifting 
(R89-Part 2: 3-4; R108: 5-6, 13-14). As an adult, defendant had five misdemeanor 
7
 The State alleged that $5,000.00 of stolen property was located; defendant 
admitted "some" stolen property was found (R#1014: 2; R#1014: 41). Approixarnately, 
$3884.00 in restitution was assessed (R#1014: 53-54). 
8
 Defendant spoke only through counsel at sentencing (R89: 8). 
7 
convictions: possession of drug paraphernalia, driving under the influence involving an 
accident, assault, and two separate incidents of disturbing the peace (id.).9 
Nevertheless, because defendant did not have any previous felony convictions and had 
not been "formally" supervised by AP & P, defense counsel requested that defendant be 
placed on home confinement for 30 days and then on probation (R89: 8). AP & P agreed that 
probation should be considered, but only if defendant first served a term in jail of six months 
straight or twelve months with work release (R89: 12). The State submitted the matter on 
AP & P's recommendation, but noted that a long jail term might delay drug treatment (R89: 
8-9). The maj ority of the victims requested defendant be imprisoned (R# 1014:100; R# 1447: 
70; R#1498: 62).10 
The trial court disagreed with defense counsel's view of his son and with the 
recommendations for probation. The court explained: 
Okay. I've had an opportunity to review the pre-sentence report and take into 
consideration everything that's been said here today. 
My observations are these, Mr. Oliver, it appears that since 1993 when 
you were about 16 years old, or 16 or 17 years old, you had quite an extensive 
juvenile court history and you've had quite an extensive adult history and its 
doesn't seem like you're going in the right direction and it doesn't seem like 
you've learned anything from earlier times when you pled guilty or were found 
guilty of matters and sentenced. You have served some time but generally 
you've been on probation quite a bit and it doesn't seem like anything has 
worked. There [sic] are not unserious crimes. You are here on a second 
9
 Without the PSI, the claim that this is the entire criminal history cannot be 
verified. See n. 4, supra. 
10
 Six victims submitted Victim Impact Statements. Three recommended prison, 
two believed community service or something less than prison would be adequate 
punishment, and one made no recommendation (R#1014: 100; R#1447: 70; R#1498: 62). 
8 
degree burglary; possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony; 
a burglary, a third degree felony; another burglary. So we have three third 
degree felonies and a second degree felony and whether these are involved 
with drug [usage] or whatever, it's basically the past 10 years of your life have 
been spent in and out of various charges and very bad behavior. 
(R89: 10-11). See Add C. The court then sentenced defendant: 
I'm going to depart from the recommendation, but I'm not going to depart in 
the way your attorney has asked for and I'm going to send you to prison and 
the reason I'm sending you to prison is to teach you that you cannot continue 
in this type of behavior, this type of behavior which says I can take drugs, I can 
steal, I can do this for the last - you're 26 years old and for 10 years you have 
done this and the time is going to stop now or you're going to spend the rest 
of your life in prison and if you want to continue to change -1 think your 
change of the last month or so has been a change to make it look good 
basically for this. I don't believe, you know, I can't compare 10 years of bad 
behavior with one month of good saying everything is fine. This isn't fine and 
to come in here and basically ask for 30 days home confinement, you know, 
under these circumstances, you know, and depart from a 6-month or a one-year 
work release. I'm sentencing you to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate 
term of 1 to 15 years on the Second [sic], zero to 5 on each of the thirds to run 
concurrently. 
(R89: 11-12). See Add C. 
Later that afternoon, defense counsel, without defendant, approached the judge and 
told him that he was "shocked and personally devastated" by the court's decision, but that 
his son accepted it (R89-Part 2: 1, 24). Counsel recognized that the court's sentence was 
lawful and stated that he was not making a motion, but said he wanted to discuss his "loss 
of confidence" in the court (R89-Part 2: 2, 11). For the next hour, counsel chastised the 
judge for imprisoning his son (R89-Part 2:1-30). He said the judge was "arbitrary" and the 
"harshest judge in the state" and characterized the sentences as "aberrant" (R89-Part 2:8,15, 
17). He believed that "there was something more in play than [counsel] was aware o f and 
9 
alleged that the judge had heard the "rumors" that his son had committed other felonies 
because the judge signed a search warrant for defendant's car a month before the sentencing 
(R89-Part 2: 8-10). The judge explained that he did not remember signing a new warrant, 
but possibly did because he signs all the search warrants for the Layton City Police (R89-Part 
2: 8-9). Counsel next alleged that the judge harbored some hidden reason for rejecting AP 
& P's recommendation (R89-Part 2:13). These allegations and criticisms continued for over 
40 minutes until the judge interjected: 
I can tell you one other thing Mr. Oliver, when you talked about AP & P, AP 
& P because of the budget of the state [sic] of Utah never, hardly ever 
recommends prison. Very seldom do they recommend prison and the reason 
for that is because they're under budget constraints. But I can tell you that we 
have a jail that is full and every time I put a person a year in jail, I get a call the 
next day from the jail to let three out and so what I've been doing and what I 
understand other judges are doing is the people who have a year commitment 
are usually going to prison now because we have too heavy of a load in the 
Davis County Jail. 
(R89-Part2:15,21). See Addendum D (Afternoon Session). Defense counsel responded that 
sending people to prison because of jail overcrowding was wrong (id.). The court opined 
that overcrowding was part of the "system," but stated that a sentencing judge does not "just 
point, you know, a thing at the wall and throw a dart and say, hum, prison; probation; jail" 
(R89-Part 2: 22). Instead, as in this case, the judge receives the presentence report and 
I read those and I make the best determination and that's what I did and I guess 
what bothers me just a little bit is the fact that you are both the attorney and as 
the father are coming into here and telling me that you have no confidence in 
the Court and all this other stuff that I don't believe you would do if you had 
somebody else that was the defendant in this case. 
(id). The court continued: 
10 
I believe that Mr. Oliver, the defendant, should go to prison based upon his 
history and what's in the pre-sentence report and upon the discretion that I 
exercised. You do not and you believe that's improper. That is a difference 
of opinion and I don't do it for anything because of my feelings toward you, 
my feelings toward your son or anybody else. It's the basis of my opinion, 
what was in the report and the exercise of my discretion and as I did with the 
other five or six people that I sent to prison today, I don't do that lightly. I 
don't do it lightly [sic] people going to jail or prison. 
(R89-Part 2: 23). See Add. D. Defense counsel continued to allege that the judge sentenced 
defendant to prison because the jail was overcrowded, the judge again clarified: 
No, that's not the only reason I recommend that. . . . I just told you the fact is 
that AP & P doesn't recommend prison because of their budget constraints and 
they've been told by the higher ups about that and so I am saying that when I 
get a recommendation and they're saying one year jail, which in reality should 
be prison, I am sending people to prison. 
(R89-Part 2: 27) (emphasis added). See Add. D. Finally, after more than an hour of 
counsel's complaints, the judge terminated the encounter (R89-Part 2: 30). 
Defendant subsequently filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty pleas (R#1014: 
55-56; R#1477:24-25; R#1498: 22-23). Defense counsel claimed that the plea bargain was 
based on defendant receiving probation and eventually being eligible for a 402 reduction, but 
admitted that defendant knew the court was not bound by the parties' recommendations 
(R108: 1-3). The court summarily denied the motion (R108: 3-4). Defendant does not 
challenge that ruling on appeal. 
Defendant also filed a "petition for post-conviction relief which sought correction 
of his "illegally imposed" sentences pursuant to rule 22(e) (R#1014: 57-62; R#1477: 26-31; 
R# 1498:24-29). Defendant alleged that the court had only sentenced him to prison because 
11 
the jail was overcrowded and had failed to reveal this fact until after sentencing (R108: 4-
10). Defendant claimed that without "extreme aggravating circumstances," his imprisonment 
was cruel and unusual because he had not been given "one chance, not even one chance to 
sit back and say, 'Okay, you're on probation, let's watch you, let's see how you're going to 
conduct your life'" (R108: 18-22). 
The court rejected defendant's arguments and concluded that no illegality occurred 
in sentencing (R108: 23). See Addendum E (Post-Judgment Ruling). The court found that 
the "record is absolutely clear" that during the afternoon encounter, the court only brought 
up prison and jail overcrowding in response to an "hour of basically, I don't knowr what you 
could call what you did," other than getting "something off your chest" (R108: 10-11). The 
court noted that only after counsel persisted in "asking things" about why the 
recommendation was not followed, the court offered its view that AP & P often did not 
recommend prison, even when warranted, because of overcrowding (Rl 08: 10-13, 20). At 
the same time, the trial judge was equally aware of problems caused by long-term 
confinements in jail (id.). Overcrowding was not, however, the basis of the court's 
sentencing determination; instead, the court 
took into consideration the fact that [defendant] had a juvenile record, that he 
had had five misdemeanors as an adult from 1995 to 1999; that he's been 
charged in a spree of felonies between June 6th and June 12th in these three 
cases; that he ultimately pled to four felonies that included burglaries and 
restitution. Taking all those things into consideration, I sentenced him to 
prison. I believe that is within due process. I believe that is not illegal and if 
it is illegal, then you have your appeal and the Appellate Court can make that 
decision. 
12 
(R108:23 & 13). See Add. E. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant, a drug addict, committed multiple felonies and misdemeanors in the course 
of burglarizing three homes. The crimes followed a ten-year history of criminal involvement. 
The court rejected recommendations for probation and imposed concurrent terms of 
imprisonment based on the crimes involved and defendant's history. The sentencing 
determination fully comported with constitutional requirements and reasonably reflected the 
legitimate personal judgment of the trial court. Consequently, defendant's challenges to his 
sentences fail. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT RELIED ON INFORMATION CONTAINED IN 
THE PRESENTENCE REPORT IN REASONABLY EXERCISING ITS 
DISCRETION TO IMPOSE STATUTORILY-AUTHORIZED 
CONCURRENT TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT, DESPITE 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROBATION 
Defendant claims that his sentences are illegal because the court allegedly did not 
timely disclose the facts underlying its sentencing decision and because the sentences were 
"fixed and mechanical" and imposed without regard to defendant's individual circumstances 
(Br.Aplt. at 9-13). Defendant's argument lack merit.11 
11
 In defendant's brief, he states two issues, but presents a joint argument {Br.Aplt 
at 2 & 9-14). The State responds to the joint argument. Additionally, while defendant 
nominally cites to the state constitution, no separate state analysis is presented. See State 
v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, ^ 2, 84 P.3d 841 (refusing to interpret state constitutional 
provision differently than its federal counterpart when appellant failed to make a separate 
state constitutional argument). 
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(A) This Court Should Not Reach the Merits Because Defendant Failed to 
Include the PSI and Failed to Marshal the Evidence in Support of the 
Court's Rulings. 
As noted, supra at n.49 even if defendant is not attacking the validity of the PSI, he 
is obligated to include the report where his arguments are necessarily connected with the 
report's contents. See State v. Headley, 2002 UT App 58 {Add. F). His failure to do so 
permits this Court to presume the regularity of the proceedings below and construe all 
ambiguities and record deficiencies in favor of the lower court's rulings. See id. 
Additionally, because defendant's arguments—that the trial court relied on an 
undisclosed factor in sentencing and defendant's incarceration is cruel and unusual—are 
necessarily fact-specific, defendant is obligated to marshal the evidence in support of the 
trial court's rulings, before he may challenge the merits of those rulings. See West Valley 
City v. Hoskins, 2002 UT App 223, Tf 13, 51 P.3d 52 (citing West Valley City v. Majestic 
Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)). Defendant has failed to do so here. 
Consequently, this Court may summarily affirm. See id. 
For example, in challenging his sentences, defendant fails to acknowledge that even 
though AP & P recommended probation with jail time, the agency also found that defendant 
had mental health problems in addition to drug addiction, that he was likely still using drugs 
because he was not in drug therapy, and that he presented "a serious threat of violent 
behavior" (R89: 2-4).12 These facts support the trial court's rejection of probation. 
12
 Below, defendant disputed some of AP & P's findings, but did not establish their 
inaccuracy (R89: 1-5). 
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Similarly, though defendant attaches the transcript of his counsel's afternoon 
encounter with the judge to his addenda, he fails to fully acknowledge the judge's statements 
during that encounter and ignores the judge's clarifications of what he meant. Compare 
State's Statement of the Facts, supra, with Br.Aplt at 7. Moreover, defendant ignores the 
court's findings and ruling in denying his post-judgment motion, other than to acknowledge 
such a hearing took place. Compare State's Statement of Facts, supra, with Br.Aplt at 5 & 
8. See also Add. E. Defendant's omissions are egregious given his rejection of this Court's 
invitation to provide supplemental briefing. See Utah Court of Appeals' Order, No. 
20030286-CA, dated 10/30/03. 
On these grounds alone, defendant's arguments may be summarily rejected. If, 
however, the merits are considered, the arguments nevertheless fail. 
(B) All Relevant Facts Were Disclosed to Defendant 
"The fair administration of justice at the least requires that the information upon 
which the judge relies in imposing punishment is accurate." See State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 
1241, 1249 (Utah 1980). Consequently, the facts relied in sentencing must be disclosed to 
a defendant to permit him an opportunity to point out any inaccuracies. Id. at 1244. Usually, 
this is accomplished through disclosure of the presentence report. Id. at 1248-49. 
Here, defendant does not claim that the PSI was not disclosed to him or that its 
contents were not accurate and reliable. Instead, defendant asserts that he was denied due 
process because the court failed to reveal "the determinative factor" for sentencing defendant 
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to prison, to wit, overcrowding in the Davis County Jail (Br.Aplt. at 7, 11-13). Defendant's 
argument lacks factual support. 
While due process requires the disclosure of determinative facts underlying a court's 
sentencing determination, it does not require disclosure of the court's mental process or its 
reasons for crediting one fact or another. Cf. Lipsky, 608 P.2d at 1246-49. Nor, as claimed 
by defendant, does due process require a court to justify its rejection of a presentence 
recommendation or specifically address aggravating and mitigating factors justifying one 
sentencing option over another. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-406 (2003); UTAH R. CRIM. 
P. 22 (general sentencing procedures); but see UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201 (2003) 
(requiring findings for imposition of a minimum mandatory term) {Add. A). 
Here, in response to counsel's hour-long afternoon criticism of the sentences, the 
judge expressed his belief that AP & P "very seldom" recommended prison, even when 
warranted, because the prison was overcrowded (R89-Part 2:21, 27). The judge stated that 
the Davis County Jail was also overcrowded and that when a defendant is sent to jail on a 
long-term commitment, the jail often calls the court and complains that it must release other 
inmates to accommodate the long-term inmate (R89-Part 2: 21). As the judge explained, 
these housing concerns did not drive his sentencing decision, but explained why the judge 
did not fully credit AP & P's recommendation (R89-Part 2: 22-23, 27). Additionally, the 
court was simply discussing the realities faced by any judge in imposing long-term jail 
commitments (R89-Part 2: 21-23). But as the judge repeatedly stated, it was the facts 
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contained in the presentence report which compelled him to sentence defendant to prison 
(R89-Part2: 10-12,22-23). 
At sentencing, during the subsequent afternoon session, and in denying defendant's 
post-judgment motion, the court consistently stated the facts it relied upon in sentencing 
defendant. These included: 
(1) defendant had committed serious multiple felony and misdemeanor 
offenses in a one week period; 
(2) three of crimes involved burglary, a crime of violence; 
(3) the crimes resulted in substantial economic loss to the victims; 
(4) defendant had committed crimes for ten years, from the age of 16 until his 
present age of 26; 
(5) defendant had at least three juvenile adjudications; and 
(6) defendant had at least five adult convictions. 
(R89: 10-12;R89-Part2: 10-12,22-23; R108:13,23). Additionally, the court believed that 
defendant's recent claims of reform were opportunistic for sentencing, but that even if the 
reform were genuine, it did not outweigh defendant's criminal history or the seriousness of 
his current crimes (R89: 11).13 
13
 During the afternoon session, defense counsel said he was "most upset" by these 
comments and that his son had reformed for six months, and not just the one month 
claimed by the court (R89-Part 2: 7-8). AP & P, however, noted that because defendant 
was not involved in drug treatment, he was probably still using drugs (R89: 2). 
Moreover, even by counsel's admission, defendant drove his wife to urine-analysis every 
week, yet did not participate in such a program himself or any other supervisory 
programs, except for a self-help group which he "generally" attended (R89: 2-3). 
Consequently, defendant's claim of reform was largely self-reported (id.). 
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In sum, as the trial court correctly found and concluded all relevant information was 
disclosed and no due process violation occurred (R108: 23). Moreover, even if the prison-
jail overcrowding aspects should have been disclosed at sentencing, any error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 402-03 (1999) 
(holding that harmless error analysis may be applied even in death penalty cases where the 
jury considers an improper factor). Defendant learned of the court's views in the afternoon 
session and, subsequently, had the opportunity to attack the relevancy and accuracies of those 
views in the post-judgment motion hearing (R89-2: 21-27; R108: 8-10). Nevertheless, the 
court stated that, in its opinion, the sentences were appropriate based on defendant's past 
criminal history and current criminal involvement (R89-2:22-23;R108:23). See discussion, 
infra. Consequently, whether the information was disclosed or not, the sentences would be 
the same. See Jones, id. 
(C) Rejection of AP & P's Recommendation Was a Permissible Exercise 
of the Trial Court's Discretion. 
Defendant's secondary argument—that his incarceration constitutes cruel and usual 
punishment—though clothed in a constitutional mantel, amounts to no more than a claim that 
the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting AP & P's recommendation. See Br.Aplt. at 
2 & 10. As defense counsel admitted below, a claim that a court abused its discretion by 
imposing a lawful sentence is a "waste of words" (R89-Part 2: 11). Given the wide variety 
of sentencing alternatives, "very wide discretion" is not only permitted the trial court, but 
"absolutely require[d]" in sentencing. Lipsky, 608 P.2d at 1244. The exercise of discretion 
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in sentencing "necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court." State v. Corbitt, 2003 
UT App 417, f 6, 82 P.3d 211. Abuse of that "vested" discretion occurs only if "'it can be 
said that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the court.'" Id. (quoting State 
v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d885, 887 (Utah 1978)). AccordStatev. Kfl/rfuviHOT, 2003 UT App 432, 
f 14,82 P.2d 1167. 
Defendant implies that the needs of the criminal are paramount in sentencing (Br.Aplt. 
at 10 & 13), This is not incorrect. The sentencing court should consider "rehabilitation, 
deterrence, punishment, restitution, and incapacitation." State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 
214, \ 5, 73 P.3d 991. "'Many different ingredients factor into the sentencing process, and 
the discretionary imposition of probation rests in many cases upon subtleties not apparent on 
the face of a cold record.'" Id. at 19 (quoting State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah 
App. 1991), and upholding determination that prison, not probation, was the appropriate 
sentence). Moreover, contrary to defendant's assertion (Br.Aplt. At 5 & 75), a "comparative 
review of other criminals and their crimes" is not required. Id. at \ 6 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Nor, as claimed by defendant {Br.Aplt. At 10-11), is the court's 
discretion 
to be surrendered to a mathematical formula by which numbers of 
circumstances rather than weight of circumstances are determinative. The 
overriding consideration is that the sentence be just. One factor in mitigation 
or aggravation may weigh more than several factors on the opposite scale. 
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State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990). In sum, a sentence will not be overturned 
simply because a defendant views "his situation differently than did the trial court." State 
v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 14, 40 P.3d 626. 
Defendant claimed below that prison was inappropriate because he had not previously 
been convicted of a felony or formally supervised (R108: 4-10, 21-22). Defendant's 
assertion that he deserved "one chance" rang hollow with the trial court in light of 
defendant's 10-year criminal history and the seriousness of his current conduct. As the court 
recognized, the problem was not that defendant had not been given a chance, but that he had 
not learned from the chances he had been given (R89: 10-12). See Add. C. 
In sum, while AP & P and the court differed in their opinions of where and for how 
long defendant should be incarcerated, they agreed that defendant's conduct warranted some 
period of substantial incarceration. See Statement of Facts, supra. Defendant disagreed and 
urged no incarceration, but only 30 days of home confinement. See id. The court 
considered defendant's current conduct (eleven felony and misdemeanor offenses reduced 
to four felonies through plea bargain), the nature of his most serious charges (burglary); the 
scope of the damage to the victims (almost $4000.00 in restitution), his past criminal 
convictions (three formal juvenile adjudications and five adult misdemeanor convictions), 
defendant's professed recent reform (which the court believed was opportunistic), and other 
information in the presentence report (including, even on this limited record, AP & P' s belief 
that defendant had mental health problems and a potential for violence). Based on these 
legitimate factors, the court determined that prison was the most appropriate sentence. While 
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others differed in their assessment of these facts, that difference does not render the court's 
ultimate determination fundamentally unfair or unduly harsh. See cases, supra. 
Finally, even if this Court were to find prejudicial defect in defendant's sentences, his 
request for relief—to "remand the matter with instructions to follow the recommendation of 
AP & P—is impermissible. See Br.Aplt. at 14. An appellate court has no right to compel 
imposition of a particular sentence, but only the authority to vacate an invalid one. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's sentences should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this $Jh day of March, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due pro-
cess of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
[Bail — Punishment.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted, 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 1896 
Sec, 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punish-
ments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not 
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 1896 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 30. Decision of the court: dismissal; notice of deci-
sion. 
(a) Decision in civil cases. The court may reverse, affirm, modify, or 
otherwise dispose of any order or judgment appealed from. If the findings of 
fact in a case are incomplete, the court may order the trial court or agency to 
supplement, modify, or complete the findings to make them conform to the 
issues presented and the facts as found from the evidence and may direct the 
trial court or agency to enter judgment in accordance with the findings as 
revised. The court may also order a new trial or further proceedings to be 
conducted. If a new trial is granted, the court may pass upon and determine all 
questions of law involved in the case presented upon the appeal and necessary 
to the final determination of the case. 
(b) Decision in criminal cases. If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a new 
trial shall be held unless otherwise specified by the court. If a judgment of 
conviction or other order is affirmed or modified, the judgment or order 
affirmed or modified shall be executed. 
(c) Decision and opinion in writing; entry of decision. When a judgment, 
decree, or order is reversed, modified, or the reasons shall be stated concisely 
in writing and filed with the clerk. Any justice or judge concurring or 
dissenting may likewise give reasons in writing and file the same with the 
clerk. The entry by the clerk in the records of the court shall constitute the 
entry of the judgment of the court. 
(d) Decision without opinion. If, after oral argument, the court concludes 
that a case satisfies the criteria set forth in Rule 31(b), it may dispose of the 
case by order without written opinion. The decision shall have only such effect 
as precedent as is provided for by Rule 31(f). 
(e) Notice of decision. Immediately upon the entry of the decision, the clerk 
shall give notice to the respective parties and make the decision public in 
accordance with the direction of the court. 
(f) Citation of decisions. Published decisions of the Supreme Court and the 
Court of Appeals may be cited as precedent in all courts of the State. 
Unpublished decisions may also be cited, so long as all parties and the court 
are supplied with accurate copies at the time all such decisions are first cited. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 2003.) 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no 
contest, the court shall set a time for imposing sentence which 
shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after the 
verdict or plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the 
defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court may 
commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recog-
nizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defen-
dant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any 
information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal 
cause why sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting 
attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in 
defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in 
defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sen-
tence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the 
court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of 
conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if-any, 
and the sentence. Following imposition of sentence, the court 
shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal and 
the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court 
shall issue its commitment setting forth the sentence. The 
officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall 
deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison and 
shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it 
with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the 
court shall impose sentence in accordance with Title 77, 
Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over 
a mentally ill offender committed to the Department of Hu-
man Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-
202(l)(b), the court shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sen-
tences allowed — Civil penalties — Hearing. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity 
for extradition or transportation and as further defined in Title 77, 
Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suf-
fered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imnrisonment: 
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(f) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(h) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty, 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the 
court shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for 
conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of 
a plea agreement. 
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall 
follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, 
Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Sub-
section (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule-
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defen3ant is transported* 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles / defendant is transported-
and ' 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
« (ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to 
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants 
actually transported in a single trip, 
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, 
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is 
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been returned, 
the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that 
the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental 
entity for the extradition. 
(6) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay court-ordered restitution to the county for 
the cost of incarceration in the county correctional facility before and after 
sentencing if: 
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in 
incarceration in the county correctional facility; and 
(ii) (A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county 
correctional facility through a contract with the Department of 
Corrections; or 
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement 
provided under Section 64-13c-301 if the defendant is a state 
prisoner housed in a county correctional facility as a condition of 
probation under Subsection 77-18-1(8). 
(b) (i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are: 
(A) the daily core inmate incarceration costs and medical and 
transportation costs established under Section 64-13c-302; and 
(B) the costs of transportation services and medical care that 
exceed the negotiated reimbursement rate established under 
Subsection 64-13c-302(2). 
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include 
expenses incurred by the county correctional facility in providing 
reasonable accommodation for an inmate qualifying as an individual 
with a disability as defined and covered by the federal Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, including 
medical and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for the 
court-ordered restitution under this Subsection (6), the court shall con-
sider the criteria provided under Subsections 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through 
(iv). 
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity 
under Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 
76-1-304, the county shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the 
defendant paid for costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a). 
(7) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or 
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify impo-
sition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promul-
gated by the Sentencing Commission. 
(8) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, rape 
of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, 
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is 
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or 
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the 
highest minimum term in state prison. This Subsection (8) takes precedence 
over any conflicting provision of law. 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limita-
tions — Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the 
order of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to 
each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consec-
utively with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or 
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively 
if the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing 
would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and 
Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, 
the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of 
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as 
provided under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the 
death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on 
conduct which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are 
imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or. 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal 
jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not 
occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect' 
of consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the 
Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been 
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly 
imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum 
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum 
terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concur-
rently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that 
provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity 
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed 
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has 
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of 
76-3-402. Convict ion of lower deg ree of offense. 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circum-
stances of the offense of which the defendant was found guilty 
and to the history and character of the defendant, concludes it 
would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being for 
that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence 
the defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that 
offense, the court may unless otherwise specifically provided 
by law enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree 
of offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction 
is considered to be for a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A 
misdemeanor and the sentence imposed is within the 
limits provided by law for a class A misdemeanor; or 
Ob) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the 
defendant is placed on probation, whether committed 
to jail as a condition of probation or not; 
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged with-
out violating his probation; and 
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the pros-
ecuting attorney, and a hearing if requested by either 
party or the court, finds it is in the interest of justice 
that the conviction be considered to be for a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this 
section unless the prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or 
on the court record that the offense may be reduced two 
degrees. In no case may ah offense be reduced under this 
section by more than two degrees. 
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any 
person from obtaining or being granted an expungement of his 
record as provided by law. 1991 
77-13-6, Withdrawal of plea, 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior 
to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only 
upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not 
knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, 
except for a plea held in abeyance, shall be made by 
motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not 
be announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held 
in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made 
within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the 
time period specified in Subsection (2)(c) shall be pursued 
under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction Remedies 
Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 2003 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL WILLIAM OLIVER DOB: 12/25/1976, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED 
INFORMATION 
Case No. 021701014 
The undersigned prosecutor states on information and belief that the defendant, 
either directly or as a party, at County of Davis, State of Utah, committed the crimes of: 
COUNT 1 
BURGLARY, 76-6-202 UCA, second degree felony, as follows: That on or 
about June 6, 2002, at the place aforesaid the defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a 
dwelling or any portion of a dwelling with intent to commit: theft. 
COUNT 2 
THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, 76-6-408 UCA, third degree 
felony, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid the defendant received, retained or 
disposed of property of another, knowing that the property had been stolen or believing that it 
probably had been stolen, or concealed, sold or withheld or aided in concealing, selling or 
withholding the property, knowing the property had been stolen, intending to deprive the owner 
thereof, and the value of said property was or exceeded $1,000, but was less than $5,000. 
COUNT 3 
POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
UCA, third degree felony, as follows: That on or about June 14, 2002, at the place aforesaid the 
defendant did knowingly and intentionally possess or use a controlled substance; to wit 
methamphetamine. 
COUNT 4 
VEHICLE BURGLARY, 76-6-204 UCA, class A misdemeanor, as follows: That 
on or about June 6, 2002, at the place aforesaid the defendant unlawfully entered any vehicle 
with intent to commit a felony or theft. 
COUNT 5 
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, 58-37a-5(l) UCA, class B 
misdemeanor, as follows: That on or about June 14, 2002, at the place aforesaid the defendant 
did knowingly, intentionally or recklessly use, or possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia 
to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, 
prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise 
introduce a controlled substance into the human body. 
COUNT 6 
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS, 76-6-205 UCA, class B 
misdemeanor, as follows: That on or about June 14, 2002, at the place aforesaid the defendant 
did have in his possession an instrument, tool, device, article, or other thing adapted, designed, or 
commonly used in advancing or facilitating the commission of any offense, under circumstances 
manifesting an intent to use or knowledge that some person intends to use the same in the 
commission of a burglary or theft. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from witness Tadd Lowe. 
Authorized September 11, 2002, 
for presentment and filing: 
MELVIN C.WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
MELVIN C. WILSON r 'ECCSD DlSTR!CT ™M 
Davis County Attorney - ^
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P.O. Box 618 MM 21 P 5=0 J 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: (801)451-4300 
Fax: (801)451-4328 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL WILLIAM OLIVER 
DOB: 12/25/1976 
Defendant. 
Bail 
INFORMATION 
Case No. 
OTNNo : tk 
The undersigned prosecutor states on information and belief that the defendant 
either directly or as a party, during June 10 through June 11, 2002, at County of Davis, State of 
Utah, committed the crimes of: 
COUNT 1 
BURGLARY, 76-6-202 UCA, a second degree felony, as follows: That at the 
time and place aforesaid the defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a dwelling or any 
portion of a dwelling with intent to commit theft. 
COUNT 2 
UNLAWFUL ACQUISITION, POSSESSION OR TRANSFER OF CARD, 76-6-
506.3 UCA, a third degree felony, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid the defendant 
acquired a financial transaction card from another without the consent of the card holder or the 
issuer, or, with the knowledge that it has been acquired without consent, and with intent to use it 
in violation of Utah Code §76-6-506.2. 
COUNT 3 
THEFT, 76-6-404 UCA, a class B misdemeanor, as follows: That at the time and 
place aforesaid the defendant obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of 
another with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and that the value of said property was 
less than $300. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from witness Shawn Lewis. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: The undersigned prosecutor is a Deputy 
Davis County Attorney and has received information from the investigating officer, Shawn 
Lewis of the Layton Police Department, and the Information herein is based upon such personal 
observations and investigation of said officer. 
1. Between the night of June 10, 2002 and the morning of June 11, 2002, an 
unknown person entered the garage of Bonnie and Layne Sackett, which is attached to their 
residence, and took a wallet and day planner that belonged to Mr. Sackett from a vehicle in the 
garage. Mr. Sackett's credit cards were in the wallet. 
2. At approximately 9:00 A.M. on June 11, 2002, Mr. Sackett's credit card was 
used at the Layton K-Mart to purchase merchandise worth $154.51. 
3. At approximately 10:14 A.M. on June 11, 2002, the defendant, Michael 
William Oliver, attempted to purchase merchandise with a value of $284.30 from the Target 
store in Layton. The store's security video shows the defendant standing at the cash register with 
Briana Salgado. It also shows the defendant handing a credit card to the store cashier. Officer 
Shane Whitaker of the Farmington Police Department has viewed the store's security video, and 
identified the defendant and Briana Salgado. 
4. On June 14, 2002, a search warrant was executed on the defendant's 
apartment. During the search officers found Layne Sackett's wallet. 
Authorized August 20, 2002 
for presentment and filing: 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis Cerunty Attorney 
Deputy Davis County Attor 
At the time of filing, issuance of a Summons rather than a Warrant of Arrest is requested. 
MELVTN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney $FC0HD DiSTKiC F COURT 
P.O. Box 618 
Farmington, Utah 84025
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL WILLIAM OLIVER 
DOB: 12/25/1976 
Defendant. 
Bail 
INFORMATION 
Case No. 
OTNNo. 
03LI70/W& Fs 
idant The undersigned prosecutor states on information and belief that the defen t 
either directly or as a party, on or about June 08,2002, at County of Davis, State of Utah, 
committed the crimes of: 
COUNT 1 
BURGLARY, 76-6-202 UCA, a second degree felony, as follows: That at the 
time and place aforesaid the defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a dwelling or any 
portion of a dwelling with intent to commit theft. 
COUNT 2 
THEFT, 76-6-404 UCA, a class B misdemeanor, as follows: That at the time and 
place aforesaid the defendant obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of 
another with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and that the value of said property was 
less than $300. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from witness Eric Johnson. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: The undersigned prosecutor is a Deputy 
Davis County Attorney and has received information from the investigating officer, Eric Johnson 
of the Farmington Police Department, and the Information herein is based upon such personal 
observations and investigation of said officer. 
1. Between the evening of June 8, 2002 and the morning of June 9, 2002 in 
Davis County, Utah someone entered the garage that is attached to the home of Paulette Brimley. 
They stole Ms. Brimleys wallet out of one of the vehicles she had parked in the garage. Ms. 
Brimley told Farmington Detective Shane Whitaker that her credit card had been used at several 
locations on Sunday, June 9, 2002. One of the locations Ms. Brimley's card was used at was the 
Target store in Layton. Detective Whitaker eventually found out that one of the individuals who 
had used the card at Target was Jereme Ogren. When Jereme was interviewed about Ms. 
Brimleys credit card, he admitted that he had used it at several different locations, but that he 
had obtained the card from the defendant, Michael William Oliver. 
2. Detective Whitaker eventually learned that an individual named Braden 
Larkin had admitted to being involved with the burglary of Ms. Brimleys garage. Detective 
Whitaker interviewed Braden, and Braden told him that he had taken the defendant to Ms. 
Brimleys residence, and the defendant entered the garage, taking a wallet and cash from a 
vehicle. 
3. On June 14, 2002, a search warrant was executed on the defendant's home. 
Among other items found were a Pier One Import card and a Chevron gas card belonging to 
Paulette Brimley. 
Authorized August 21, 2002 
for presentment and filing: ^~\ 
MELVINC. WILSON \ 1 
Davis County Attorney,. / \ 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
At the time of filing, issuance of a Summons rather than a Warrant of Arrest is requested* 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL D 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF U 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL WILLIAM OLIVER 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 021701014 
021701447 
021701498 
I, MICHAEL WILLIAM OLIVER, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of 
and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty to the following crime(s): 
A 
B 
C 
Crime & Statutory 
Provision 
Burglary of Dwelling 
Possession Controlled Substance 
(District Court Case 021701014) 
Burglary of Building 
(District Court Case 021701447) 
Burglary of Building 
(District Court Case 021701498) 
Degree 
Felony 2 
Felony 3 
Felony 3 
Felony 3 
Punishment 
Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
1-15 years 
0-5 years 
0-5 years 1 
0-5 years 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Informations against me. I have read them, or had 
them read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty. 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty are: 
bmOdjLM^ U)lfi\ iVkhj- h OfYJAMAJJ-ir *&$$- * • 
TkfifrcsSfcm 9 CbvdcvollfiA $uh$kt4Ue', kM^riMX^u a ^ ki/U Mf^aJlxj^ 
posvsse^ <L Schedule. ?a*%. suhskfau-e.. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) listed above. 
I stipulate and agree that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for 
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty plea and prove 
the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty: 
1. In Case 021701014. Dennis Gray reported that sometime during the early morning hours of 
June 6, 2002, his garage, which is attached to his home, was entered and several credit cards, checks, and 
other items were stolen out of this vehicle. Bradon Larkin was interviewed and stated that he was with 
defendant when they entered the Mr. Gray's home and stole checks, credit cards and other items from his 
vehicle. 
2. On June 14, 2002. a search warrant was executed on the home of defendant as a result of that 5 o M € ' 
search, caac^ —$5,000.00 ill stolen property was found, along with methamphetamine and drug 
paraphernalia. 
3. In Case 021701447. between the night of June 10, 2002 and the morning of June 11, 2002, an 
unknown person entered the garage of Bonnie and Layne Sackett, which is attached to their residence, 
and took a wallet and day planner that belonged to Mr. Sackett from a vehicle in the garage. Mr. Sackett's 
credit cards were in the wallet. 
4. At approximately 9:00 A.M. on June 11, 2002, Mr. Sackett's credit card was used at the 
Layton K-Mart to purchase merchandise worth $154.51. 
5. At approximately 10:14 A.M. on June 11, 2002, the defendant, Michael William Oliver, 
attempted to purchase merchandise with a value of $284.30 from the Target store in Layton. The store's 
security video shows the defendant standing at the cash register with Briana Salgado. It also shows the 
defendant handing a credit card to the store cashier. Officer Shane Whitaker of the Farmington Police 
Department has viewed the store's security video, and identified the defendant and Briana Salgado. 
6. On June 14, 2002, a search warrant was executed on the defendant's apartment. During the 
search officers found Layne Sackett's wallet. 
7. In Case 021701498, between the evening of June 8, 2002 and the morning of June 9, 2002 in 
Davis County, Utah someone entered the garage that is attached to the home of Paulette Brimley. They 
stole Ms. Brimley's wallet out of one of the vehicles she had parked in the garage. Ms. Brimley told 
Farmington Detective Shane Whitaker that her credit card had been used at several locations on Sunday, 
June 9, 2002. One of the locations Ms. Brimley's card was used at was the Target store in Layton. 
Detective Whitaker eventually found out that one of the individuals who had used the card at Target was 
Jereme Ogren. When Jereme was interviewed about Ms. Brimley's credit card, he admitted that he had 
used it at several different locations, but that he had obtained the card from the defendant, Michael 
William Oliver. 
8. Detective Whitaker eventually learned that an individual named Braden Larkin had admitted 
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to being involved with the burglary of Ms. Brimley's garage. Detective Whitaker interviewed Braden, 
and Braden told him that he had taken the defendant to Ms. Brimley's residence, and the defendant 
entered the garage, taking a wallet and cash from a vehicle. 
9. On June 14, 2002, a search warrant was executed on the defendant's home. Among other 
items found were a Pier One Import card and a Chevron gas card belonging to Paulette Brimley. 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering this plea voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under the 
constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty I will give up all the 
following rights: 
Counsel. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot afford 
one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might later, if the 
judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service to me. 
I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I 
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty. I also 
understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of nw guilty plea. 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is A?)A?U C<£ 
My attorney and I have folly discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my 
guilty plea. 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial (unbiased) jury 
and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty. 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, 
(a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and (b) my attorney, 
or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the 
witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call witnesses if I 
chose to and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of those 
witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have a jury 
trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to testify, no one 
could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself I also know that if I chose not to testify, 
the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty, I am 
presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the 
charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State 
would have the burden of proving each element of each charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is 
before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
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I understand that if I plead guilty, I give up the presumption of innocence and will be admitting 
that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I would 
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an appeal, the State 
would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I 
plead guilty. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the statutory and 
constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime to which 
I am pleading guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be 
subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a 
prison term, fine, or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. 
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crime(s), including 
any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime involved, 
the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the same time 
(concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I plead to. I also 
know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been 
convicted or which I have plead guilty, my guilty plea now may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on 
parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states 
on the record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate. 
Plea bargain. My guilty plea is not the result of a plea bargain between myself and the 
prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully 
contained in this statement, including those explained below: 
f(ffi[)ichm\ Afih MT %$$&l6Y\ tkOnirfdlUd 6uUstaAU£, h h& tA^roCe^X 
bejt^LjL U. /yia^CcJ JtuJiLt* AUA^LZJI ^ lL-3^o^ &% L K ^ ^ ^ 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of M &<}*#*?*** 
probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing, made or sought by 
either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know that any 
opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
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Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful influence 
of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty. No promises except those contained in this 
statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by an attorney, and I understand its 
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements are correct. 
I am satisjSed with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am years of age. I have attended school through the /* /-—grade. I can read and 
understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided to me. 
I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment 
when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or 
intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of understanding 
these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental disease, defect, or 
impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty plea, I must file a written motion to 
withdraw my plea within 30 days after I have been sentenced and final judgment has been 
entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show good cause. I will not be allowed 
to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any reason. 
Dated this t1 day of A/fl/vcm 4 * / , 2002. 
7 
DEFENDANT 
Certificate of Defense Attorhey 
I certify that I am the attorney for MICHAEL WILLIAM OLIVER, the defendant above, and that I 
know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have discussed it with him/her and 
believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically 
competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of 
the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, 
along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are 
accurate and true. 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
5 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against MICHAEL WILLIAM 
OLIVER, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the 
defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations 
are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record 
before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction of 
defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea is entered and that the^ceptance of the plea would serve 
the public interest. / J J ^  
PROSECUTION ATTORNEY 
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the defendant and 
counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the signatures and finds that 
the defendant's guilty plea is freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty plea to the crime(s) set forth in the 
Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this 3/34-Jy day of 0 Omr^l><A_ , 2003, 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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Addendum C 
1 so based upon the simple fact that he did not have a prior 
2 felony for drugs, is the reason why he was not accepted into 
3 drug court. Otherwise, he was a candidate for that program and 
4 they would have accepted him except for that and we discussed 
5 that directly with Judge Memmott. And so that was a direction 
6 that we were taking initially and had he had a prior felony 
7 conviction that would count for drug court, he would have been 
8 in drug court and this would have been handled substantially 
9 different. It was just for the fact that he did not have that 
10 l prior felony is what puts us before this Court today, 
11 recognizing Mr. Oliver's conduct, and I don't mean to minimize 
12 that. I just wanted the Court to understand that there was 
13 another alternative that we were looking at, agreed to by the 
14 I County and myself and just did not work out because he record 
15 was not bad enough. 
16 THE COURT: Well, his record wasn't bad enough for 
17 drug charges. 
18 J MR. OLIVER: For the drug court. That's what I'm 
19 talking about. I'm not talking about anything else, Your 
20 Honor. We're not trying to minimize anything, I'm just saying 
21 for the drug court. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. I've had an opportunity to review 
23 the pre-sentence report and take into consideration everything 
24 that's been said here today. 
25 I My observations are these, Mr. Oliver, it appears 
10 
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1 that since 1993 when you were about 16 years old, or 16 or 17 
2 years old, you had quite an extensive juvenile court history 
3 and you've had quite an extensive adult history and it doesn't 
4 seem like you're going in the right direction and it doesn't 
5 seem like you've learned anything from earlier times when you 
6 pled guilty or were found guilty of matters and sentenced. You 
7 have served some time but generally you've been on probation 
8 quite a bit and it doesn't seem like anything has worked. 
9 There are not unserious crimes. You are here on a second 
10 degree burglary; possession of a controlled substance, a third 
11 degree felony; a burglary, a third degree felony; another 
12 burglary. So we have three third degree felonies and a second 
13 degree felony and whether these are involved with drug or 
14 whatever, it's basically the past 10 years of your life have 
15 I been spent in and out of various charges and very bad behavior. 
16 I'm going to depart from the recommendation, but I'm 
17 not going to depart in the way your attorney has asked for and 
18 I'm going to send you to prison and the reason I'm sending you 
19 to prison is to teach you that you cannot continue in this type 
20 of behavior, this type of behavior that basically says I can 
21 take drugs, I can steal, I can do this for the last - you're 26 
22 years old and for 10 years you have done this and the time is 
23 going to stop now or you're going to spend the rest of your 
24 I life in prison and if you want to continue to change - I think 
25 | your change of the last month or so has been a change to make 
11 
1 it look good basically for this. I don't believe, you know, I 
2 can't compare 10 years of bad behavior with one month of good 
3 saying everything is fine. This isn't fine and to come in here 
4 and basically ask for 30 days home confinement, you know, under 
5 these circumstances, you know, and depart from a 6-month or a 
6 one-year work release. I'm sentencing you to the Utah State 
7 Prison for an indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years on the 
8 Second, zero to 5 on each of the thirds to run concurrently. 
9 1 I'm ordering that restitution be paid in the amount of 
10 $3,883.92. That can be subject to your request to have a 
11 hearing on the restitution, DNA testing, and payment of the $75 
12 fee. You will have 30 days to appeal this sentence. You'll 
13 also have 30 days to file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea 
14 and you're going to be committed forthwith, 
15 I MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, may be approach briefly? 
16 THE COURT: Yes, 
17 (Whereupon a sidebar discussion was held) 
18 J (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 I -c-
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1 police report. I've read it. And the police report said, he's 
2 been involved in numerous burglaries. They drove up and down 
3 the streets looking for additional burglaries, in the police 
4 report. He had not been involved in anything and he's not - he 
5 was not charged with any burglaries. He was not charged with 
6 anything of that nature from that offense or from that 
7 situation and yet this comment of a month ago is very curious 
8 to me because that's when this warrant was signed and you can 
9 say, "Well, I didn't know anything about it." There was 
10 nothing said that would lead this Court to believe that one 
11 month — 
12 THE COURT: Hold on just a minute. The month issue, 
13 you brought up the month that you said that he has been living 
14 with you for the past month. That's the only month that I 
15 brought up. 
16 MR. OLIVER: Excuse me, didn't say any such thing 
17 Your Honor. I said he's been with me, and I started off and I 
18 said he's been with me since July 3rd which was 22 days after 
19 he was incarcerated. Go back and listen to the record because 
20 I've never said a month, never. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 MR. OLIVER: Never. It didn't come from me. 
23 THE COURT: Well, okay, well, first of all, if you 
24 have your speech that you want to give about how you've lost 
25 I confidence in me as a judge because you feel like I am the 
10 
1 hardest judge that ever existed in the state of Utah, you are 
2 entitled to that opinion but I got a pre-sentence report that 
3 said that the recommendation was one year in jail and one year 
4 in jail, and I can tell you, there were about six people that 
5 went to prison today. Your son wasn't the only one. Your son 
6 wasn't the only one that had one month or one year that was in 
7 the Davis County Jail that was suggested to go to prison and 
8 all I can say is on the basis of the background that I saw in 
9 that pre-sentence report, his age, and the fact that we had the 
10 number of felonies that we had, a second degree felony, three 
11 third degree felonies and basically the past background and 
12 history, that is what I based my opinion on. If you believe 
13 that is abuse of discretion, you can appeal the sentence. 
14 MR. OLIVER: You and I both know that that's a waste 
15 of words to me, to everybody else. A lawful sentence — 
16 THE COURT: If you say-
17 (Both talking) 
18 MR. OLIVER: A lawful sentence is not an abuse of 
19 discretion. 
20 THE COURT: Let me finish, Mr. Oliver. 
21 MR. OLIVER: Don't insult my intelligence either 
22 because— 
23 THE COURT: Don't insult mine then. 
24 MR. OLIVER: I'm not. 
25 THE COURT: Mr. Oliver-
11 
1 MR. OLIVER: I'm speaking my piece. 
2 THE COURT: Well, if you came in here to just want to 
3 give me a speech that I'm a bad judge and no other judge in the 
4 state of Utah would have done this, I didn't do this because 
5 you represented your son. I didn't do this for anything other 
6 than what I read and basically based upon my discretion and 
7 that's what I did it on. I did not do it on any agenda that I 
8 have against you, any agenda I have against your son, anything 
9 about a search warrant that was signed by me about him. I 
10 don't even recall that. Anything that I did was on the basis 
11 of what I read and I believe that that was the appropriate 
12 sentence. If you believe it is wrong, if you believe it is so 
13 bad that no other judge would be able to do this in history, 
14 then you might be able to say that that's abuse of discretion 
15 if not another person but Judge Kay would have done that. 
16 So, I'm happy to hear - you are entitled to your 
17 opinion but I also have to say to you most of the things that 
18 you have been saying to me right now, you said first of all I 
19 want to express my displeasure and my loss of confidence in the 
20 bench, I don't want to reargue this and then for the last half 
21 hour, you've reargued this. You've reargued — 
22 MR. OLIVER: No, I'm explaining my loss of confidence 
23 and this Court is not going to call my son back in here and re-
24 sentence him. I know that. I haven't asked for it and I know 
25 I that. Okay-
12 
1 that I was thought was existent. That's not what I've come 
2 here to talk about now. I've come to talk about a criminal 
3 history and facts surrounding this case. That's it. I've 
4 explained - I've basically gone through everything I had to 
5 say. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. 
7 MR. OLIVER: But the situation is, your comment about 
8 a month didn't come from me, not at all. 
9 THE COURT: Well -
10 MR. OLIVER: And it gives me great concern. 
11 THE COURT: Well, you can believe what you want to 
12 believe and probably nothing I say will change your belief. I 
13 said a month because that had been somehow discussed. I didn't 
14 j bring that out of the air and I didn't bring that out of the 
15 air saying but really what I've done is taken something else to 
16 consider that I didn't raise with counsel— 
17 MR. OLIVER: You didn't say that. 
18 THE COURT: Well, I didn't. 
19 MR. OLIVER: You didn't. That's one of my concerns. 
20 THE COURT: I didn't and I haven't and whatever you 
21 want to believe that you think that I've done something else in 
22 making my decision, I did not and if you don't believe that, 
23 then you can file your motions. If you have to file regarding 
24 either the motion to withdraw the guilty plea or a motion to 
25 say that the sentence is an abuse of discretion but otherwise, 
20 
1 I can tell you one other thing Mr. Oliver, when you talked 
2 about AP&P, AP&P because of the budget of the state of Utah 
3 never, hardly ever recommends prison. Very seldom do they 
4 recommend prison and the reason for that is because they're 
5 under budget constraints. But I can tell you that we have a 
6 jail that is full and every time I put a person a year in jail, 
7 I get a call the next day from the jail to let three out and so 
8 what I've been doing and what I understand other judges are 
9 doing is the people who have a year commitment are usually 
10 going to prison now because we have too heavy of a load in the 
11 Davis County Jail. 
12 MR. OLIVER: That's wrong. No, no, no, Your Honor, 
13 may I speak please? 
14 THE COURT: Well, I'm just talking about -
15 MR. OLIVER: I understand that. 
16 THE COURT: I'm just saying that today -
17 MR. OLIVER: I accept that. 
18 THE COURT: - today, for example, and last week and 
19 the weeks before, people who have been getting one year, have 
20 been going to prison. 
21 MR. OLIVER: But Your Honor, and I understand that 
22 you're saying that, but I'm telling you that's wrong. These 
23 are people's lives that we're dealing with and the— 
24 THE COURT: Let me tell you something. This is 
25 I right. These are people's lives and we also have a system and 
21 
1 that system is based on this issue that a judge, given an AP&P 
2 report, has to exercise their discretion and make the decision 
3 that they think is proper in the appropriate circumstance, 
4 which I try to do. I don't come out here and just point, you 
5 know, a thing at a wall and throw a dart and say hum, prison 
6 here; probation; jail. No, I read those and I make the best 
7 determination and that's what I did and I guess what bothers me 
8 just a little bit is the fact that you as both the attorney and 
9 as the father are coming into here and telling me that you have 
10 no confidence in the Court and all this other stuff that I 
11 don't believe you would do if you had somebody else that was 
12 the defendant in this case. 
13 i MR. OLIVER: In this case I certainly would. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 MR. OLIVER: In this case I certainly would. 
16 THE COURT: We have a difference of opinion. 
17 MR. OLIVER: No, no. That's right. 
18 THE COURT: Yes, we do. 
19 J MR. OLIVER: I said that's right. 
20 THE COURT: I believe that Mr. Oliver, the defendant, 
21 should go to prison based upon his history and what's in the 
22 pre-sentence report and upon the discretion that I exercised. 
23 You do not and you believe that that's improper. That is a 
24 difference of opinion and I don't do it for anything because of 
25 j my feelings toward you, my feelings toward your son or anybody 
22 
1 else. It's the basis of my opinion, what was in the report and 
2 the exercise of my discretion and as I did with the other five 
3 or six people that I sent to prison today, I don't do that 
4 lightly. I don't do it lightly people going to jail or prison. 
5 MR. OLIVER: You know, you've said this and — 
6 THE COURT: And I will say one other thing. This job 
7 is not the easiest job in the world and the two hardest things 
8 when people ask you what are the hardest things to do, the 
9 first one is sentencing people. That's the hardest thing to 
10 do. Secondly, is giving custody of children in a divorce 
11 action. Those are the two hardest things that I believe a 
12 judge does and when anybody asks me that question like they did 
13 at North Layton Jr. High yesterday in Reality Town that I 
14 attended, those are the two questions that they were asking. 
15 What is the hardest thing a judge does and that's exactly the 
16 answer I give to everybody. This isn't an easy thing to do and 
17 it isn't easier when I do my best and then told, you know, 
18 that you have no respect for me as a judge because I made the 
19 decision I made. I'm sorry. I'm sorry that I can't please you 
20 but I can tell you one thing, there's not a single sole I've 
21 pleased in this courtroom today because any time you sentence 
22 them, no one is pleased. One side or the other is not pleased 
23 in any lawsuit. 
24 MR. OLIVER: It's interesting -
25 J THE COURT: I simply try to do my best. 
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1 believe with all my heart and not just as a father but as a 
2 defense attorney, that the system is intended to do two things, 
3 rehabilitate and protect the public and if punishment is there, 
4 okay, but that's not - as long as we can rehabilitate and 
5 protect the public that's what we're after and the bottom line 
6 is that when you get a recommendation for jail and because the 
7 jail is full you put people into prison is wrong. 
8 THE COURT: What I said -
9 MR. OLIVER: Because they don't deserve prison. 
10 THE COURT: Let's just clarify something-
11 MR. OLIVER: They don't deserve prison if the jail 
12 recommendation is there because right now, right now, what you 
13 have done in this case alone, is taken away his opportunity to 
14 sit on a jury. The 402 would have rehabilitated that but 
15 you've taken that away from him because you sent him to prison. 
16 402s are no longer eligible, never were, but he's no longer 
17 eligible for 402 treatment because he's gone to prison, 
18 THE COURT: I understand that. 
19 MR. OLIVER: So he's going to remain a convicted 
20 felon which the county and the State felt after their 
21 evaluation of the case, that if he did well on probation he was 
22 worthy of• a lesser treatment. You've taken that away from him. 
23 You've taken away from him the opportunity even on a drug 
24 related basis to go into ARSAT and instead because AP&P 
25 J recommended a year in jail, you sent him to prison because the 
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1 jail is too full. 
2 THE COURT: No, that's no the only reason I recommend 
3 that. 
4 MR. OLIVER: I understand. 
5 THE COURT: I just told you the fact is that AP&P 
6 doesn't recommend prison because of their budget constraints 
7 and they've been told by the higher ups about that and so I am 
8 saying that when I get a recommendation and they're saying one 
9 year jail, which in reality should be prison, I am sending 
10 people to prison. 
11 MR. OLIVER: They actually said six months in jail. 
12 THE COURT: They said six months-
13 MR. OLIVER: Straight time. 
14 THE COURT: -or one year, yes. I don't know. If you 
15 have anything else to say, please say it but I don't know - I 
16 mean, I'm happy to hear what you wanted to say but I'm not 
17 changing my opinion. 
18 MR. OLIVER: I'm not asking you to. You haven't 
19 heard me once say please change your mind. 
20 THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to. 
21 MR. OLIVER: I haven't asked you to. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. 
23 MR. OLIVER: That's not why I did this. I did this-
24 THE COURT: So where do we go from here then if you 
25 J say you have no respect for me? Do you not want to appear in 
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1 sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing 
2 made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting 
3 attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know that any 
4 opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge 
5 may do, is not binding on the judge." And based upon the law 
6 as I understand it, as to a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, 
7 the fact that the State agreed that there would be a two step 
8 reduction on 402A is not binding and that is made clear in this 
9 form that's been approved by the Utah Supreme Court. So I'm 
10 going to deny that motion. 
11 So which one do you wish to do next? We have a 
12 petition for post-conviction relief; a motion to correct the 
13 sentence; and then a motion to stay the sentence. 
14 MR. OLIVER: I think we'll do the motion to correct 
15 the sentence at this time, Your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. 
17 MR. OLIVER: This is pursuant to Rule 22 in the Utah 
18 Rules of Criminal Procedure. This would be 22E. It says "the 
19 court may correct an illegal sentence where a sentence imposed 
20 in an illegal manner at any time." In this particular matter, 
21 Your Honor, at the time of sentencing, the pre-sentence report 
22 was prepared and I'd like to just go back through the PSI with 
23 regard to the offenses that Mr. Oliver had faced in his history 
24 and if the Court has the PSI in front of it, it's on page 6. 
25 THE COURT: I don't have the PSI. 
* Ifoft 
1 MR. OLIVER: I don't think I have an extra one but 
2 I'd be happy to let the Court review mine as well if the Court 
3 so desires. 
4 THE COURT: I'm making notes. Go ahead. 
5 MR.~ OLIVER: Okay. Mr. Oliver as a juvenile was 
6 convicted of three offenses. One was a possession of tobacco 
7 which is a status offense and an infraction. The next thing 
8 that Mr. Oliver was convicted of stemmed out of one incident, 
9 May 15th, 1994 incident, possession of marijuana and drug 
10 paraphernalia. Both of them are Class B Misdemeanors. Those 
11 are the only things in Mr. Oliver's juvenile history that he 
12 was convicted of were those three offenses that I've indicated 
13 stemming from two particular occasions. The tobacco was a 6-1-
14 93 and the possession of marijuana and paraphernalia were May 
15 15th of *94. 
16 There was there other juvenile history. Some status 
17 offenses, none...there were motion hearings, review hearings, 
18 things of that nature, some cases that were dismissed, things 
19 of that nature that went on. There was no felonies or anything 
20 of that nature. 
21 Then as an adult, Mr. Olive has been charged with 
22 five offenses. On April 4th of 9^5 he was charged with 
23 possession of paraphernalia to which he pled guilty. It was a 
24 Class B Misdemeanor. On March 2nd of 1996 he was charged with 
25 DUI to which he pled guilty. On July 21, 1996 he was charged 
1 with simple assault to which he pled guilty. On November 2 6th, 
2 1998 he pled guilty to disturbing the peace and on February 
3 12th, 1999 he pled guilty to disturbing the peace. Those are 
4 his total offenses. He has five. They were all misdemeanors, 
5 never were any of them charged as felonies and reduced to 
6 misdemeanors. They were misdemeanors at the outset and he 
7 virtually pled guilty straight up to all of them except it 
8 looks like the disturbing the peace was an amended charge but 
9 that was it. So he's only been charged with misdemeanors in 
10 his past, never a felony. He has never been on supervised or 
11 formal probation. That's contained within the pre-sentence 
12 report. That's on page 7 of the pre-sentence report. It says 
13 probation parole history, the defendant has never been 
14 supervised on formal probation. 
15 This Court at the time of sentencing indicated, it 
16 says, x Y^ou have served some time but generally you've been on 
17 probation quite a bit and it doesn't seem like anything has 
18 worked." Then it goes on to say that he's been involved in 
19 this type of conduct in and out of various charges and very bad 
20 behavior for the last 10 years. Then you indicate that you're 
21 going to send him to prison to teach him a lesson that he 
22 cannot continue this type of behavior. It says, and then you 
23 go on to say, "I think the change of the last month or so, has 
24 been changed to make it look good basically for this. I don't 
25 believe you, you know. I can't compare 10 years of bad 
1 behavior with one month of good saying everything is fine." 
2 But again, I went back through the transcript and in no place 
3 did anyone mention a month. Mr. Oliver had been arrested on 
4 June 14th and then released for an incarceration on July 3rd 
5 and he had been out from July 3rd to January 16th and that's the 
6 time period that I had addressed and he had changed his life 
7 around totally and completely during that time period; had been 
8 drug free; had had a full time job, was productive; had gotten 
9 married; was doing numerous productive things with his life and 
10 certainly it was not one month period of time. He had changed 
11 his life around. 
12 Also, the co-defendants in this matter and I went 
13 through the co-defendants, one of the co-defendants, Breanna 
14 SolDaro Oliver, was ordered to serve 35 days in jail and that 
15 was suspended. She was a co-defendant. Braydon Larkin was 
16 placed on probation to AP&P for the offense of attempted 
17 distribution of a controlled substance, a Class A Misdemeanor 
18 and it was noted that in the police report in Case #021701498 
19 that Braydon Larkin was actually, admitted that he had entered 
20 the garage and took the wallet and cash from the victim that 
21 Mr. Oliver actually pled guilty to and Braydon Larkin in the 
22 PSI on page 4, actually admitted to that particular offense. 
23 David Reed, there was no information. I don't know his status 
24 and Jeremy Olthron was on probation for child abuse, a third 
25 degree felony, and property obtained by unlawful conduct, a 
1 Class B Misdemeanor and Mr. Olthron had absconded and is a 
2 fugitive from justice. I don't know his status today. 
3 Each one of these co-defendants had received 
4 considerably less of a sentence than Mr. Oliver had received, 
5 and then when I spoke with the Court later, the Court indicated 
6 that one of the reasons that Mr. Oliver had been sentenced to 
7 prison was because the jail was full and the jail also does 
8 contract housing with regards to the federal system. It also 
9 does contract housing for INS and for the prison itself and as 
10 a matter of fact I just recently received a brochure from the 
11 prison indicating that Mr. Oliver could actually be housed in 
12 Davis County under contract with the County as a state 
13 prisoner. With all of this in mind, Your Honor, and referring 
14 to State v. (inaudible). Has the Court had the opportunity to 
15 review that case? 
16 THE COURT: Why don't you tell me how that case 
17 applies to this that this was imposed, sentence was imposed in 
18 an illegal manner. 
19 MR. OLIVER: Okay, I'm going to read directly from 
20 (inaudible) a couple of provisions. In (inaudible) it's 
21 quoting Howell, State v. Howell, 707 P Second, 115, it says, "A 
22 sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the 
23 defendant in light of his background and the crime committed 
24 and also serve the interest of society which underlie the 
25 criminal justice system." That's also quoted in State v. 
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1 McClendon which indicates that the sentencing judge has 
2 discretion in determining what punishment fits both the crime 
3 and the offender and then the court goes onto say, "We have 
4 consistently sought to sure up the soundness and reliability of 
5 the factual basis upon which the judge must rely in the 
6 exercise of that sentencing discretion." Quoting State v. 
7 Lipski, 608 P Second, 1241, requiring disclosure of pre-
8 sentence report. Then it says, "Although Rule 22A implements 
9 sound procedures aimed at insuring that a trial court bases its 
10 sentencing decision on such information, a criminal defendant's 
11 right to be sentenced based on relevant and reliable 
12 information regarding his crime, his background, and the 
13 interests of society stands independent of the Utah Rule of 
14 Criminal Procedure, 22A" and that's, they're referring to the 
15 constitution provision, Article I, Section 7, the due process 
16 provision. 
17 What happened in (inaudible) was that at the time of 
18 sentencing, the defendant failed to appear and his was in front 
19 of Judge Frederick in the Third District. The defendant failed 
20 to appear. It was on a Class A and Class B Misdemeanor. Judge 
21 Frederick, based upon he failure to appear, sentenced the 
22 defendant to the maximum that he could, one year in the county 
23 jail and six months in the county jail. The sentence was 
24 appealed and the Court of Appeals vacated the sentence saying 
25 I the defendant's failure to appear is not a factor, or it's one 
1 factor that may be considered but it is not a basis upon which 
2 to impose maximum jail time, and then they went on to indicate 
3 that - and this is where the phrase comes that it should be 
4 based on relevant, reliable information regarding his crime, 
5 his background, and the interests of society and that the due 
6 process requirement that the sentence be appropriate to the 
7 person, the crime, the background of the person, that that's 
8 what the Court should consider and the Court is expected to 
9 follow the due process procedures, due process and allow the 
10 defendant due process and sentence him accordingly. So they 
11 vacated the sentence and sent it back down. 
12 In this particular case, our position is that if the 
13 jail is full, that that is not a basis to send Mr. Oliver to 
14 prison for. The recommendation was, from the PSI was for six 
15 months in the county jail, straight time. This Court indicated 
16 that whenever you get a one year sentence recommendation, that 
17 you automatically send them to prison because the jail is full 
18 and that based thereupon, that' s what you were going to do in 
19 this case. 
20 THE COURT: Well, first of all just so the record is 
21 absolutely clear, the only thing that was said at the time of 
22 the sentencing was at the beginning. When you came back at 
23 4:21 p.m., you made the statement, "I recognize that once this 
24 Court sentences people to prison that the Court loses 
25 I jurisdiction for the most part and this is not a motion.'' And 
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1 then after another hour of basically, I don't know what you 
2 could call what you did. I've read this transcript today and 
3 all I can say is that it reminded me of what happened on the 
4 second hearing, or the second time you wanted to make your 
5 statement which was not quote, "In the nature of a motion'' or 
6 anything else other than to get something off your chest and 
7 then you used the basis of a statement made at that point as 
8 the basis of the decision. That's what the record is. 
9 MR. OLIVER: And that's fine, and I'll be happy to 
10 read into the record what the statement was because that was a 
11 statement that— 
12 THE COURT: Maybe you can clarify for me, Mr. Oliver, 
13 can you tell me then that I as a judge then, if I'm going to 
14 put somebody in for a year and whether they serve a year in the 
15 prison or if they serve a year in the jail, and one is crowded 
16 and one isn't, that at no time can I ever have that as a 
17 consideration? Is that what you're saying that that is 
18 illegal? 
19 MR. OLIVER: I'm not sure I understand your question 
20 but that's not the sentence. If you sentence him to a year, 
21 that's a year and that year should be in the jail. However, if 
22 you're sentencing to prison, it's an indeterminate term for one 
23 to 15. That is not one year. This Court does not sentence 
24 people to prison for one year. It becomes then the purview of 
25 I the Board of Pardons to deal with that. So sentencing to jail 
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1 for one year is not the same thing as sentencing to prison for 
2 one to 15. 
3 THE COURT: Okay, anything further as to this motion? 
4 MR. OLIVER: If I may just - I'm sorry I thought I 
5 had it marked. I wasn't going to go that far into the 
6 afternoon hearing, but... Okay. We were talking about the 
7 month issue. This is - I don't have a page number on that 
8 particular copy. We were talking about the month issue and 
9 then we went on and I says, well, (inaudible) said, "Well, I 
10 didn't." And I said, "You didn't, that's one of my concerns." 
11 The Court says, "I didn't and I haven't and whatever you want 
12 to believe that you think that I've done something else in 
13 making my decision, I did not and if you don't believe that, 
14 then you can file your motions. If you have to file regarding 
15 either the motion to withdraw the guilty plea or a motion to 
16 say that the sentence is abuse of discretion, otherwise I can 
17 tell you one other thing, Mr. Oliver, when you talk about AP&P, 
18 AP&P because of the budget of the State of Utah hardly ever 
19 recommends prison, very seldom do they recommend prison and the 
20 reason for that is because they're under budget constraints, 
21 but I can tell you that we have a jail that is full and every 
22 time that I put a person a year in jail, I get a call the next 
23 day from the jail to let three out and so what I've been doing 
24 and what I understand other judges are doing, is the people who 
25 J have a year commitment are usually going to prison now because 
12 
1 we have too heavy a load in the Davis County Jail." That was 
2 the Court's own statement to me when we were talking about this 
3 one month issue and then the Court made that statement to me. 
4 That was at the 4:00 o'clock afternoon hearing. 
5 But our position is that the sentence was imposed in 
6 an illegal manner because due process considerations were not 
7 there. The fact that the jail is full is not a factor for Mr. 
8 Oliver to go to prison. I've had occasion to discuss this with 
9 people from the prison and numerous other attorneys and I have 
10 found no one that indicates that indeed a jail being full is a 
11 basis to send someone to prison, especially someone who has 
12 never been on formal probation, never been charged with a 
13 felony. This was a non-violent felony. 
14 THE COURT: Well, just so the record's clear and the 
15 statement was made not in a motion, not at the time of 
16 sentencing, but just so it's clear, that was never anywhere in 
17 the transcript of the entire two hearings that we had until 
18 almost 5:30 that was it ever said that that was the basis upon 
19 which. You were asking things and I gave you that. That 
20 wasn't the sole basis. I mean, in anywhere of this discussion 
21 did we have that there were six felonies and five misdemeanors 
22 in these cases and then he pled to four felonies, all that took 
23 place in a week's period of time from June 6 to June 12, 2002 
24 besides his five misdemeanors, besides his juvenile court 
25 I record beforehand? Was that the history? 
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MR. OLIVER: 
question. 
THE COURT: 
MR. OLIVER: 
THE COURT: 
MR. OLIVER: 
THE COURT: 
answer the question. 
charges in the three 
felonies and four or 
I'm sorry, I'm not sure I understand the 
In these cases— 
The current charges-
Let me— 
The current charges-
Don' t ask a question and then not let me 
The question was that in the current 
files, there are as I count them six 
five misdemeanors that took place in a 
period of June 6th through June 12th of 2002, is that accurate 
or not? 
MR. OLIVER: 
THE COURT: 
That's what he was charged with. 
And then he pled guilty to four felonies, 
three third degree felonies and a second degree felony; is that 
correct? 
MR. OLIVER: 
THE COURT: 
That's correct. 
And so that's what he pled to and you 
talked about the five adult misdemeanors. Then he had also a 
juvenile court record? 
MR. OLIVER: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
THE COURT: Okay, and that-
MR. OLIVER: An infraction and two misdemeanors. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right, anything further on 
this matter, on this motion? 
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1 MR. OLIVER: No, not at this time. 
2 THE COURT: What is the position of the State? 
3 MR. PETERSON: The position of the State is pretty 
4 simple and straight forward that the Court did not abuse its 
5 discretion in issuing the sentence, that the sentence that was 
6 issued is the statutory guidelines for second and third degree 
7 felonies, that at the time the plea was taken, the Court 
8 advised Mr. Oliver, the defendant Mr. Oliver, that potential 
9 penalties for these guilty pleas are as follows: one to 15 and 
10 zero to five on the third degrees and the Court followed that 
11 and the Court hasn't gone beyond anything and did not abuse its 
12 discretion in issuing this sentence. 
13 THE COURT: What is your understanding, Mr. Peterson, 
14 as to what it means when it says an illegal manner under that 
15 rule? What type of things are - what is the sentence when it's 
16 an illegal manner? 
17 MR. PETERSON: When a sentence is in an illegal 
18 manner? 
19 THE COURT: Yes. Is that something like where if 
20 it's a third degree felony and you give them five to life 
21 instead of zero to five? 
22 MR. PETERSON: That is how I would interpret it or if 
23 someone pled guilty to a Class A Misdemeanor and they were 
24 sentenced to the prison instead of jail or a fine level is 
25 I $10,000 instead of $5,000 where it should be. An illegal 
15 
1 sentence in my mind is one that goes beyond the statutory 
2 provisions for each count. 
3 THE COURT: Okay, do you have anything further? 
4 MR. PETERSON: I do not. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. Is there any reply? 
6 MR. OLIVER: Yes, as a matter of fact, the fact of 
7 Lanosec which is 428 Utah Advanced Report 10 and it's a 2001 
8 Utah Appeals, so it's a 2001 case is contained within the 
9 annotations of the section talking about sentence imposed in an 
10 illegal manner. That's where I found Lanosec is when I went 
11 through and read the notations. So obviously it's not just 
12 contemplated that it's a sentence that exceeds the statutory 
13 requirements but also one that exceeds due process requirements 
14 and the Court of Appeals has treated it that way and they 
15 decided it in the court's therewith and so the circumstances 
16 are that the court felt that imposing a maximum sentence 
17 because of his failure to appear was imposed in an illegal 
18 manner and it was an illegal sentence. They reversed it, they 
19 vacated the sentence and reversed it and that's where we are. 
20 MR. PETERSON: And if I may, Your Honor, I think Mr. 
21 Oliver is accurate that the judge in that gave the maximum 
22 because the defendant didn't appear. That is to differentiate 
23 the facts. That is not what occurred here in this case. A 
24 thorough PSI or pre-sentence report was conducted and the 
25 I defendant was present, the defendant was aware of the potential 
16 
1 penalties, the court in making its sentence actually reviewed 
2 the record, advised at the time of the sentence that because of 
3 the defendant's background this is the consideration the Court 
4 was taking. Even if we count part of the consideration of the 
5 prison as part of your statement that it's usual that they may 
6 go to prison, if the sentence is for one year or more at the 
7 jail, that all of those factor in an due process was given to 
8 Mr. Oliver in this case, when in the Lanosec matter was simply 
9 a matter of you failed to appear, you are getting the maximum 
10 which didn't take into account any of his prior history, any of 
11 his prior background. We don't know the final ending of that 
12 case. Mr. Manosa could easily have gone back to the sentencing 
13 judge and ended up with the maximum anyway after the judge 
14 considered all of the factors in the case. 
15 THE COURT: Anything further? 
16 MR. OLIVER: Just briefly. With regards to this, 
17 what Mr. Lanosec ended up in the long run has no relevancy to 
18 this case whatsoever not does it change the outcome of the 
19 case. The outcome of the Lanosec case was that you should go 
20 through and you should evaluate the individual, you should look 
21 and see about his rehabilitative ability, the ability to be 
22 supervised, all of these things you need to take a look at and 
23 then base there upon, enter a sentence that is appropriate to 
24 the defendant. That's the theory behind the Lanosec. It's not 
25 I just a matter of whether he appeared or whether he didn't 
17 
1 appear. They're saying, as a matter of fact the Court of 
2 Appeals states, "Although Rule 22A implements sound procedures 
3 aimed at insuring that the trial court bases its sentencing 
4 decision on such information, a criminal defendant's right to 
5 be sentenced based on relevant and reliable information 
6 regarding his crime, his background and the interest of society 
7 stands independent of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.7' 
8 So it goes further and it says that "indeed that the discretion 
9 is not absolute." 
10 I recently read in the newspaper about a case wherein 
11 an individual was given 800 hours of community service as a 
12 result of two armed robberies wherein a gun was used and I find 
13 that this particular situation with Mr. Oliver is far less 
14 egregious than armed robbery on two different occasions with a 
15 shotgun. Now, I don't know the other person's personal 
16 background or history, don't know what the recommendations 
17 were. Here the recommendation was six months straight time, 12 
18 months with work release. The County at that time recommended 
19 60 to 90 days with work release. So after those professionals 
20 who have dealt with the case all along, AP&P, the county 
21 attorney, they made the recommendations and there is no 
22 compelling reason in this case to depart from the 
23 recommendations that were received. There's not extreme 
24 aggravating circumstances. And I also went through at the time 
25 J of sentencing and went through and talked about some of the 
18 
1 mitigating circumstances. For example, it says "offender 
2 presents a serious threat of violent behavior" that's not true. 
3 That's marked inaccurately in this circumstances. That is not 
4 true. "Offender continued criminal activity subsequent to 
5 arrest" that is not true. We pointed that out that indeed what 
6 had happened was the charges came down after his arrest. He 
7 was picked up and incarcerated. There was no further conduct. 
8 Then in the mitigating, the AP&P put in there "Offender's 
9 attitude suggests amenability to supervision" they included 
10 that. That was #7. #8, "Offender has exceptionally good 
11 employment and/or family relationships. #9, "Imprisonment 
12 would entail excessive hardship on offender or dependents." 
13 Those were checked off by AP&P as mitigating circumstances. I 
14 then believe that there was two others, restitution would be 
15 severely compromised by incarceration and that the offender had 
16 extended period of arrest free street time which stemmed back 
17 to his last incident in Colorado in 1999. So— 
18 THE COURT: So let me ask a question. Are you saying 
19 then that if the people at Adult Probation and Parole do a 
20 recommendation and the county attorney concurs or does a 
21 recommendation and the defendant concurs and does a 
22 recommendation and the judge doesn't follow the recommendations 
23 of those people, that that becomes an illegal sentence or an 
24 abuse of discretion? 
25 I MR. OLIVER: I don't think I've said that. 
19 
1 THE COURT: Okay, then tell me then, there have been 
2 many times when they have asked for jail and I have not given 
3 jail. There has been times when they haven't asked for it and 
4 I have given it or they've asked for jail and I've given 
5 prison. If you were here today you would have seen three or 
6 four more of the people go to prison and sometimes I follow the 
7 recommendations and sometimes I do not but it's been my 
8 understanding that what a judge is suppose to do is he's 
9 suppose to take into consideration all the facts and give the 
10 best sentence that they can do based upon all the circumstances 
11 and that's what I did and so if it's illegal, if all we're 
12 going to do from now on, part of your argument both here and in 
13 the afternoon of the last hearing, and here today is that 
14 you're not following what AP&P says, you're not following what 
15 the county attorney says, we don't need judges for sentencing, 
16 we can just have AP&P be the sentence. Judges would be 
17 perfunctory because what we would have to do is give all of the 
18 ability to sentence people to Adult Probation and Parole and 
19 until and unless that is the system, I do not know what to do 
20 otherwise than to do the best I can with the information that's 
21 been given. 
22 MR. OLIVER: You know, I went through prior to, 
23 (inaudible) time over to the county attorney and actually 
24 comment that you requested input on and— 
25 J THE COURT: Requested what? 
20 
1 MR. OLIVER: That you requested input on from the 
2 attorney here today. I went through and I never once tried to 
3 do anything other than just address a regular sentencing and 
4 why I thought he should not be in prison. 
5 Now, you've brought it down to where I think that we 
6 should go with judges and just let AP&P and county attorney 
7 determine. I haven't said that. I've not even tried to go 
8 there. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. How many times have you said 
10 today, Mr. Oliver, and how many times have you said in this 
11 transcript going over what AP&P recommended, what AP&P 
12 recommended and what AP&P recommended and then just before I 
13 made my comment you were talking about that AP&P have 
14 recommended this, the county attorney had recommended this and 
15 then you don't follow it? So what is your argument? And I 
16 asked the question, if a judge departs from what AP&P does, 
17 then is that either an illegal sentence or an abuse of 
18 discretion? I just want to know what your position is. Why is 
19 it in this circumstance and not when I do it in another case 
20 when I don't follow their direction? 
21 MR. OLIVER: There's never been supervised probation 
22 for Mr. Oliver. There has never been a felony charge 
23 previously with Mr. Oliver. Normally to end up at prison, you 
24 work to get there. You go through the system several times and 
25 J you're placed on probation. You succeed, you fail or whatever 
21 
1 the case may be but you get a chance to show that once they 
2 slap you up side the head and have your attention, are you 
3 going to straighten up your life and fly straight and then not 
4 go back there again? If you choose not to do that, you're 
5 brought back again, the court then looks at it a little bit 
6 different and gives maybe a harsher sentence but still - and it 
7 depends upon the crime and it depends on the person, it depends 
8 on a lot of things but the circumstances are you don't start 
9 off a first felony, non-violent, as I indicated previously, 
10 this is not a particularly aggravated crime. I recognize we 
11 can throw the numbers out and Mr. Oliver did not deny the 
12 numbers but we can throw the numbers out there but the 
13 circumstances are that Mr. Oliver has not been through the 
14 system and been given that one chance, not even one chance to 
15 sit back and say, "Okay, you're on probation, let's watch you, 
16 let's see how you're going to conduct your life. You're facing 
17 real serious stuff here. Now go prove to us that you don't 
18 deserve the break or that you do deserve the break." This says 
19 I'm not going to give you the break. 
20 So, you know, when the system and due process is of 
21 such a nature that says you should consider the individual, the 
22 nature of the crime and the needs of society, then sentences 
23 should be commensurate one with another with other people. It 
24 should not be disparate and in this particular case, that's 
25 I exactly where we are. This is a desperate sentence. This is 
22 
1 his first felony charge. He's never been on probation before 
2 and he starts off in prison. Prison is a last resort on a 
3 first resort. 
4 THE COURT: Anything further? 
5 MR. OLIVER: Nope. 
6 THE COURT: Anything further from the State? 
7 MR. PETERSON: Submit it. 
8 THE COURT: Okay, as it relates to the second motion 
9 which is petition for post-conviction relief and motion to 
10 correct the sentence imposed in an illegal manner, I'm denying 
11 that motion for the following grounds. First of all, I do not 
12 believe that this sentencing violated due process; that under 
13 the case law or statutes that it was illegal; that I took into 
14 consideration the fact that he had had a juvenile record, that 
15 he had had five misdemeanors that had gone as an adult from 
16 1995 to 1999; that he'd been charged in a spree of felonies 
17 between June 6th and June 12th in these three cases; that he 
18 ultimately pled to four felonies that included burglaries and 
19 restitution. Taking all those things into consideration, I 
20 sentenced him to prison. I believe that is within due process. 
21 I believe that is not illegal and if it is illegal, then you 
22 have your appeal and the Appellate Court can make that 
23 decision. 
24 Okay, let's go to our third motion. It's the motion 
25 to stay sentence pending defendant's post-judgment motions and 
23 
Addendum F 
Not Reported in P 2d 
2002UTApp58 
(Cite as: 2002 WL 287890 (Utah App.)) 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Thomas C. HEADLEY, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 990462-CA. 
Feb 28, 2002. 
Edward R. Montgomery, Salt Lake City, for 
appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Thomas Brunker, Salt Lake 
City, for appellee. 
Before JACKSON, GREENWOOD, and THORNE, 
JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
JACKSON, Presiding Judge. 
*1 Thomas Headley appeals the district court's denial 
of his Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence submitted 
under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. He contends the district court erred in 
ruling that his motion did "not attack the legality of 
the sentence imposed nor the manner in which the 
sentence was imposed." Headley's contention is two-
fold: (1) his counsel at sentencing provided 
ineffective assistance; and (2) the sentencing court 
relied on information in the presentence report that 
the court knew was false. We affirm. 
A district court's Rule 22(e) decision is a legal 
question that we review for correctness, see State v 
Brooks, 908 P2d 856, 858-59 (Utah 1995); State v 
Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 384-85 (Utah Ct App.1997), 
and we can affirm the decision "if it is sustainable on 
any legal ground or theory apparent on the record." 
State v Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, f 31, 994 P 2d 1243. 
Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides for resentencing when a sentence is illegal 
or "imposed in an illegal manner." Utah R Crim. P. 
22(e). The definition of an "illegal sentence" has been 
construed narrowly to include only sentences "where 
the sentence does not conform to the crime of which 
the defendant has been convicted." [FN1] State v 
Parker, 872 P2d 1041, 1043 n. 2 (Utah 
Ct.App.1994). Utah law has no comprehensive 
definition of sentences "imposed in an illegal 
manner"; however, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled 
that a sentence is imposed in an illegal manner when 
a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel during sentencing. 
[FN2] See Kuehnert v Turner, 28 Utah 2d 150, 499 
P.2d 839, 841 (1975) (concluding that the sentence 
was illegal because the defendant did not have 
counsel at sentencing, was not informed of his Sixth 
Amendment rights during sentencing, and had not 
knowingly and intelligently waived his Sixth 
Amendment rights). [FN3] In Kuehnert, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that the presence of counsel at 
sentencing is necessary 
FN1. Nonconforming sentences include 
those where the sentence exceeds the 
statutory limits See, eg, State v 
Higginbotham, 917 P2d 545, 551 (Utah 
1996) (concluding that the sentence was 
illegal because statute only authorized one 
year enhancement and the court enhanced 
sentence by two years), State v Patience, 
944 P2d 381, 388 (Utah Ct App 1997) 
(noting that the sentence was illegal because 
it exceeded statutory term) Nonconforming 
sentences also occur when the court is 
without jurisdiction to impose a sentence 
See, eg, State v Hurst, 111 P2d 1029, 
1036 n. 6 (Utah 1989) (stating that 
sentences can be attacked when beyond the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court) State v 
Arviso, 1999 UT App 381, ffi| 5-8, 993 P 2d 
894 (stating that the sentence was illegal 
because Supremacy Clause deprived 
sentencing court of jurisdiction), State v 
Grate, 947 P 2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 
Ct App 1997) (stating that the sentence was 
illegal because court did not have 
jurisdiction to revoke probation) 
FN2. Other jurisdictions have defined 
sentences imposed m an illegal manner as 
those that are within statutory and 
jurisdictional limits, but violate a 
defendant's rights, see, e g, Government of 
the VI v Martinez, 239 F 3d 293, 299 n 3 
(3rd Cir 2001), State v McNeills, 546 A 2d 
292, 305-06 (Conn Ct App 1988) State v 
Sieler, 554 N W 2d 447, 479 (S D 1996) cf 
State v Anderson, 661 P 2d 716, 720-24 
(Haw Ct App 1983) State v Brooks, 589 
A 2d 444, 447 (Maine 1991), or that are 
based on erroneous information See, e g, 
United States v Katzin, 824 F 2d 234, 238 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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(3rd Cir. 1987). 
FN3. Kuehnert, which discusses illegal 
sentences under the rules in force prior to 
Rule 22(e), was not cited in the parties' 
briefs. 
so that there is a real opportunity to present to the 
court facts in extenuation of the offense or in 
explanation of the defendant's conduct, as well as 
to correct any errors or mistakes in reports of the 
defendant's past record and to appeal to the equity 
of the court in its administration and enforcement 
of penal laws. 
M a t 840-41. [FN4] 
FN4. See also McConnellv. Rhay, 393 U.S. 
2, 4, 89 S.Ct. 32, 33- 34 (1968) ("As we 
said in Mempa [v Rhay, 389 U.S. 128,135, 
88 S.Ct 254, 257 (1967) ], 'the necessity for 
the aid of counsel in marshaling the facts, 
introducing evidence of mitigating 
circumstances[,] and in general aiding and 
assisting the defendant to present his case as 
to sentence is apparent.' The right to counsel 
at sentencing must, therefore, be treated like 
the right to counsel at other stages of 
adjudication." (Citation omitted.)). 
Headley first claims his counsel at sentencing 
provided ineffective assistance, thus depriving him of 
his Sixth Amendment right. To support his claim, 
Headley makes six assertions, four are as follows: (1) 
he asserts that his challenge to misinformation in the 
presentence investigation report was rejected by the 
sentencing court because it was poorly handled by 
sentencing counsel; (2) he challenges several factual 
statements contained in the presentence investigation 
report; (3) he asserts that "his own counsel accused 
him of being involved in incest when that information 
was not otherwise before the court"; and (4) he 
asserts that "his [sentencing] counsel convinced a 
witness with potentially exculpatory evidence not to 
cooperate with [Headley]." Each of these four 
assertions has some connection with the presentence 
investigation report, which is not in the record on 
appeal. Further, no other information in the record 
supports these assertions. Accordingly, as discussed 
below, we are unable to address them. 
*2 Next, Headley claims the sentencing court 
imposed a $10,000 fine without reason and without 
objection by his counsel. We find no mention of a 
$10,000 fine in the record. The only fines mentioned 
in the sentencing context, a $1,000 recoupment fee 
and an unspecified amount to "pay for costs of 
extradition and for therapy of victim," are found in 
the sentencing transcript and the Judgment filed three 
days later. Finally, Headley alleges that "his counsel 
intentionally tried to prevent him from pursuing an 
appeal." However, the record reflects that Headley 
filed a notice of appeal on September 24, 1992, but 
voluntarily moved to dismiss his appeal to "file a 
motion to withdraw his plea of guilty." Headley's 
motion was granted on October 8, 1992, and the 
record contains no indication of subsequent attempts 
to appeal the case. 
Without the presentence report or other information 
which may or may not be in the sentencing court 
record, the record submitted to us is inadequate for 
our review of Headley's ineffective assistance claim. 
All we have are Headley's unilateral, bald assertions 
of misconduct. As we have stated, 
When a defendant predicates error to [an 
appellate court], he has the duty and 
responsibility of supporting such allegation by an 
adequate record. Absent that record, a defendant's 
assignment of error stands as a unilateral 
allegation which the reviewing court has no 
power to determine. [An appellate court] simply 
cannot rule on a question which depends for its 
existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the 
record. Consequently, in the face of an 
[in] adequate record on appeal, [we] must assume 
the regularity of the proceedings below. 
State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (1998) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted) (alterations 
in original); see also State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 
t 17, 12 P.3d 92 ("Where the record appears 
inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies 
resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor 
of a finding that counsel performed effectively."). 
Accordingly, we reject Headley's Sixth Amendment 
claim. 
Next, Headley claims the sentencing court was 
biased because it relied on information in the 
presentence report that the court knew was false. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (Supp.2001) gives a 
sentencing judge discretion in evaluating information 
in a presentence report and requires the judge to 
"make a determination of relevance and accuracy on 
the record." Here, the sentencing judge made a 
determination of the relevance and accuracy of the 
presentence report, deciding the presentence report 
was "comprehensive in all the details," and stating 
that those working on elements of the presentence 
report "do a pretty good job." The sentencing court 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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has broad discretion to resolve factual disputes for or 
against a defendant, see id, and we cannot say the 
court exceeded its discretion in making this 
determination. Further, without the presentence 
report, the record is inadequate and " '[we] must 
assume the regularity of the proceedings below.' " 
Penman, 964 P.2d at 1162 (citation omitted) 
(alteration in original). 
*3 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial 
of Headley's Rule 22(e) motion for resentencing. 
WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., J, concur. 
GREENWOOD, Judge (concurring in the result). 
I concur in the result reached by my colleagues, but 
would affirm on what I perceive to be a more 
straightforward basis. As stated by the majority, the 
trial court denied defendant's Rule 22(e) motion 
because the motion did "not attack the legality of the 
sentence imposed nor the manner in which the 
sentence was imposed." The trial court was correct. 
Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel and erroneous fact findings by the sentencing 
judge are simply not cognizable under Rule 22(e). 
Defendant has not cited any caselaw holding 
otherwise and has also not offered any reasoned 
analysis for why Rule 22(e) should apply to his case. 
See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) 
(briefs must include "reasoned analysis based on 
[cited] authority"). The sentence imposed was 
permissible under applicable statutes, and the trial 
court properly resolved factual disputes presented to 
it. Defendant raises no claims legitimately related to 
whether the sentence was illegal or "imposed in an 
illegal manner." Utah R.Crim. P. 22(e). On that basis, 
I would affirm. 
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